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I. Introduction 
In most commercial exchange, formal legal principles and court 
systems play a surprisingly small role for transacting parties.  Stuart 
Macaulay interviewed a group of Wisconsin business people in the 1960s 
and found that they had little regard for the prospect that lawyers could add 
value to a transaction.
1
  To the contrary, interviewees complained that 
lawyers often got in the way of their business dealings, and that they 
preferred to do business by handshake rather than by contract.
2
  When 
contracts were drafted at the formation of their business relationships, they 
were typically tossed into a drawer or file and never again consulted.  These 
business people typically resolved their conflicts through extralegal means, 
without regard to the terms of their contract and without resort to formal 
dispute resolution processes.
3
 
Even when contracting parties do end up involved in disputes they 
cannot resolve on their own, some claim that they are much more likely to 
resort to informal dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and 
arbitration, than they are to resort to courts.  For example, Lisa Bernstein 
has documented the extensive use of arbitration by firms in the 
commodities trade, by which they opt out of the court system altogether and 
enforce trade rules by reputational sanctions rather than government force.
4
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1. Stewart Macaulay, Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963). 
2. Id. at 58. 
3. Id. at 61. 
4. See generally, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the 
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (examining the 
National Grain and Feed Association as a private legal system); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (examining the use of private legal systems in the 
cotton industry). 
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Such a reliance on private dispute resolution has led some to suggest that 
courts have become effectively irrelevant to commercial law.
5
 
It turns out that innovation is distinctly different, however.  According 
to recent studies, parties to innovative contracts and those operating in 
innovative environments rely much more heavily on lawyers and contract 
documents than do their counterparts in non-innovative environments.  For 
example, Iva Bozovic and Gillian Hadfield recently conducted a follow-on 
study to McCauley’s to glean whether today’s business people share the 
same contempt for lawyers, contracts, and courts that McCauley observed 
in 1963.
6
  They found that California business people operating in firms that 
conducted business deemed non-innovative shared the same attitudes that 
McCauley observed.
7
  But those operating in firms involved in innovation 
reported very different attitudes.
8
  These business people regularly 
consulted with lawyers in putting together their deals, and they routinely 
wanted a formal written document to memorialize their agreements.
9
  
Moreover, the contract would regularly be consulted, at least privately, 
when conflict emerged.
10
 
Bozovic and Hadfield explain the difference between innovating and 
non-innovating firms as resulting from differences in the thickness of 
business norms.  In more static business environments, norms of acceptable 
commercial conduct develop to guide the behavior of market actors.
11
  
When conflict arises in these commercial contexts, the norms become the 
reference point for the parties, making formal legal institutions largely 
irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.
12
  By contrast, in 
innovative contexts, where a market, good, or service is just emerging, 
 
5. Of course, some authors have suggested that sophisticated parties prefer courts to 
arbitration, as shown by the limited use of arbitration clauses in corporate transactional contracts.  
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex 
Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 
335 (2007); see also Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (“In practice, arbitration does not seem to compete strongly with 
well functioning public courts.”).  The two positions can be reconciled, it turns out, based on the 
types of contracts examined.  See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses 
Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 457 67 (2010) 
(noting that arbitration clauses are most prevalent in ordinary contracts between businesses but are 
less likely to be found in contracts outside of the ordinary course of business, e.g., loan 
commitments and merger agreements). 
6. Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal 
Relations in Support of Innovation 6 (Aug. 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=ghadfield. 
7. Id. at 9. 
8. Id. at 10. 
9. Id. at 16 17. 
10. Id. at 22. 
11. Id. at 5. 
12. Id. at 15. 
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shared business norms typically have not yet developed.
13
  The parties 
therefore use lawyers and contracts as norm substitutes.
14
 
Notwithstanding this reliance on legal documents, however, Bozovic 
and Hadfield’s interviewees consistently expressed a strong commitment to 
staying out of court.
15
  The documents might guide their transacting 
behavior, but disputes were to be settled privately.
16
  This last finding is 
consistent with common intuitions about commercial-party avoidance of 
courts.  Scholars have documented a number of private mechanisms that 
parties commonly use for avoiding or resolving contract disputes, including 
expected future gains and the use of prepayment, hostage taking, collateral, 
reputational sanctions, and mediation, among others.
17
  In most cases, these 
mechanisms can be cheaper, quicker, and more effective than courts, and 
many of them are more likely to fulfill the goal of preserving the future 
benefits of the parties’ relationship.
18
  Not surprisingly, then, they show up 
as common features of commercial contracts and trade-association support 
systems.
19
 
Even though innovating firms rely on lawyers and contracts, the terms 
that they negotiate often cannot be enforced in a court of law.  In their work 
on contracting for innovation, Gilson, Sabel, and Scott emphasize the fact 
that most of the critical terms of contracting parties’ relationships cannot be 
specified in contracts that contemplate the development of innovative 
products and services.
20
  In the context of joint venture or innovative 
outsourcing contracts, for example, the parties are contracting for the 
production of something that does not yet exist.  In that environment, it is 
impossible to specify price and quantity.  Indeed, parties cannot typically 
specify either the end result or the parties’ duties in developing the 
 
13. Id. at 5. 
14. Id. at 6 7. 
15. Id. at 18 20. 
16. Id. at 16 17. 
17. See, e.g., id. at 19 20 (documenting expected future gain and reputational sanctions as 
performance assurances); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services 
Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 341 (1999) (noting prepayment and 
security as methods for insuring against nonperformance); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: 
The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 58 (citing mediation as an alternative mechanism 
to resolve disputes); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 20 (1983) (arguing that hostage taking is “widely used 
to effect credible commitments”). 
18. Stipanowich, supra note 17, at 58. 
19. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of 
Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 120 (2013) 
(stating that commercial contracts in the United States are increasingly “provid[ing] for mediation 
as one step of several in a dispute resolution clause”). 
20. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The 
Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 170, 194 96 (2013). 
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innovation.
21
  Thus, many of the critical terms in these contracts are 
necessarily fatally vague, without an effective remedy, or both, at least from 
a legal standpoint.
22
 
When parties do have disputes over concrete terms that need outside 
enforcement, they often seek to have those disputes resolved in arbitration 
rather than in courts.
23
  Arbitration can be quicker and cheaper than 
resorting to courts,
24
 and arbitration enables the parties to choose a decision 
maker with greater expertise in the subject matter of the dispute than is 
possible with judges.
25
  Because of these and other benefits, some 
commentators have asserted that arbitration is a superior venue in which to 
resolve intellectual property (IP) disputes.
26
  
Given party attitude toward courts and the ready availability of 
substitute private mechanisms for dispute resolution, one might be surprised 
to ever see contracting parties insisting on a right to file suits in court.  This 
should be especially true at the drafting stage of a contract because focusing 
on possible future legal battles can signal to the other party an anticipation 
of waging such battles.  Furthermore, given the effective unenforceability 
of the essential terms of contracts for innovation, the last thing innovating 
parties should be focused on is preserving rights to file lawsuits. 
Yet a significant and growing number of contracting parties are 
demanding precisely this right: a right to go to court for the resolution of 
particular claims and to obtain particular remedies.  In empirical studies that 
we have conducted jointly and separately, we have found parties that 
incorporate arbitration clauses into their agreements commonly carve out 
specific rights to proceed in court.
27
  Moreover, the vast majority of these 
 
21. Id. at 194. 
22. Id. at 199. 
23. E.g., Matthew C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy, 5 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 173, 197 (2010) (“[Parties to collaborative agreements] resort to arbitration far more 
often than commercial parties resolving disputes relating to more traditional types of commercial 
contracts.”). 
24. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 5, at 451. 
25. See, e.g., Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial 
Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People: A Forced Rank 
Analysis, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 203, 203 04 (2002) (identifying arbitrator expertise as a factor in 
choosing arbitration over other forms of adjudication). 
26. E.g., Anne St. Martin & J. Derek Mason, Arbitration: A Quick and Effective Means for 
Patent Dispute Resolution, 46 LES NOUVELLES 269, 278 (2011); Richard H. Sayler, The Case for 
Arbitrating Intellectual Property Licensing Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. Apr. 2005, at 62, 67. 
27. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 113 14 (2008) [hereinafter Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration]; 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) [hereinafter Drahozal & O’Hara 
O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure]; Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 762 64 [hereinafter Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses]; Erin O’Hara 
O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 137 (2012) 
[hereinafter O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration]; Randall Thomas, 
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contractual provisions preserve rights to proceed in court in order to protect 
information and innovation.
28
  Specifically, parties are opting to have 
claims related to their noncompete, confidentiality, and nonsolicitation 
clauses, as well as their trademark, copyright, and patent rights and trade 
secrets resolved in courts.  Alternatively, parties reserve a right to proceed 
to court to obtain injunctive relief, the critical remedy for the protection of 
these rights.
29
 
These contracts illustrate the weaknesses of self-help remedies and the 
relative shortcomings of arbitration in the context of innovation.  In fact, 
when these carve-outs are combined with contracts that do not call for 
arbitration in the first place, sometimes as much as 80%–90% of contracts 
studied end up opting for courts rather than arbitration in these contexts, 
and the choices are made with increasing frequency over time.  
Notwithstanding private contracts and largely unenforceable terms, parties 
increasingly demand courts over arbitration for the protection of their 
intellectual property rights. 
This Article explores party use of contract terms that express a 
preference for courts for the enforcement of rights surrounding innovation.  
Part II briefly explains the advantages of courts over arbitration in 
protecting innovation.  Part III describes the empirical findings that support 
our assertion that private parties demand courts for the protection of their 
innovation.  Part IV then explores the implications of our findings for the 
applicable rules applied by courts.  Notwithstanding scholarly assertions 
that courts are becoming increasingly irrelevant for the resolution of 
commercial disputes,
30
 they likely will continue to play an essential role in 
supporting party rights to innovation. 
II. Courts and Innovation 
As demonstrated in Part III, parties who agree to resolve disputes 
through arbitration commonly carve out a right to use courts instead for the 
enforcement of rights that protect information and innovation.
31
  When we 
have presented these empirical results to alternative dispute resolution 
experts, the use of carve-outs from arbitration clauses has surprised many, 
including arbitration practitioners, who have told us that they would advise 
their clients against using them.  The problem, as described by practitioners, 
is that carve-outs create a risk that the parties will be stuck simultaneously 
 
Erin O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 999 1000 (2010) [hereinafter 
Thomas et al., CEO Employment Contracts]. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 74 89. 
29. See infra Table 1. 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 1 6. 
31. See infra text accompanying notes 74 89. 
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litigating their dispute in both court and arbitration, with potential legal 
battles over the jurisdictional dividing line between the two.
32
  Despite these 
potential objections, the empirical results suggest that transactional 
attorneys apparently conclude that this risk of bifurcated claims is offset by 
the benefits from court resolution of claims related to the protection of 
information and innovation.  What perceived benefit might cause the 
transactional lawyers to draft carve-outs, especially when the privacy of 
arbitration can help parties to protect the value of their private information 
or innovation? 
We think that courts can provide several benefits to parties attempting 
to protect their information and innovation.  First, parties evidently perceive 
courts as having a relative advantage in providing injunctive relief to the 
parties because in our studies of a variety of contract types, parties 
commonly expressly reserve a right to obtain such relief in courts.
33
  Such 
property-type protections might well prove essential to the parties’ efforts 
to protect the value of their information and innovation.  In many cases, it 
may be functionally impossible to ascertain the money-damage equivalent 
of the loss of these items.  For example, Gilson, Sabel, and Scott point to 
such difficulties in their explanation of the relatively unique form of 
contracts for innovation.
34
  In particular, they emphasize the fact that in 
contracts for innovation, the parties cannot identify ex ante the innovative 
results of their collaboration, let alone value it; as a result, expropriation 
along the way toward development should pose daunting problems for 
ascertaining money damages.
35
  In other contracts that do not themselves 
involve the creation of innovation, money damages for the loss of 
innovative rights can be very difficult, if not impossible, to prove.  Indeed, 
scholars commonly lament the inadequacy of standard monetary damages 
in the context of information and innovation.
36
 
 
32. See, e.g., John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, 
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. Apr. 2003, at 28, 31 (“The drafter should be especially cautious about 
giving in to the temptation to advise the client to agree to arbitrate some types of disputes and go 
to court for others.”); see also Richard L. Lionberger, Arbitration Clauses: Beware the Injunctive 
Relief Exception, JD SUPRA L. NEWS (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/file 
server.aspx?fName=6b7bd500 dc62 4c2d b314 afb1d4c42ba0.pdf (“[I]f the parties desire that 
their disputes be arbitrated, including an exception for actions for specific performance would 
seem to make little sense.”). 
33. As discussed in Part IV, in the aftermath of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006), several courts have imposed more onerous standards on the issuance of injunctions.  
See infra notes 143 44 and accompanying text.  This practice could have the effect of dampening 
preferences for courts in some of our more recent contracts and in future contracts. 
34. Gilson et al., supra note 20, at 194 95. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 917 
(4th
 
ed. 2007) (discussing the inadequacy of damages in trademark cases); Andrew S. Friedberg, 
Possession as Threat: Temporary Injunctions to Protect Trade Secrets, ADVOCATE, Winter 2008, 
at 77, 78 (rehashing the familiar notion that damages often do not fully compensate the trade 
        
2014] Supporting Innovation 2183 
 
In addition, courts are better suited to providing the emergency relief 
that may be necessary to prevent serious harm to parties’ intellectual 
property rights.  Arbitrators typically have the authority to grant provisional 
relief.
37
  But by the time an arbitrator is selected or an arbitral tribunal is 
constituted, which can easily take forty to ninety days,
38
 substantial harm 
may already have occurred to a party’s trademark or significant value from 
a patent or trade secret may already have been lost.
39
  Although arbitration 
institutions sometimes provide standing panels for emergency relief,
40
 
parties seem to lack confidence in such arbitral procedures and only rarely 
use them.
41
  Because courts are continually in session and tend to apply 
predictable expedited hearing procedures,
42
 courts also have an advantage 
over arbitration for matters in which emergency relief may be important. 
More generally, for contracts whose terms are largely unenforceable, 
as is the case for contracts for innovation, tools for ensuring cooperation are 
essential.  Gilson, Sabel, and Scott explain that in these contracts the parties 
braid together a combination of enforceable and nonenforceable terms, with 
the enforceable terms protecting the end stage of the relationship.
43
  This 
insight could be stated slightly differently: parties seek protection in the 
event that things go wrong, and one way for a party to protect itself is to 
specify a right to the information or innovation.
44
  Moreover, a threat to be 
able to take the innovation can force the other party to cooperate and to 
renegotiate the terms of the relationship if needed.  Many of the technology, 
 
secret owner); Kollin L. Rice, Ohio Law Governing Employee Covenants Not to Compete: A 
Practitioner’s Guide to Current Trends and the Impact of Ohio’s Adoption of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 347, 362 & n.100 (1996) (highlighting the fact that damages in 
noncompetition clause cases are “notoriously difficult to prove”). 
37. E.g., UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) § 8(b), 7 U.L.A. 34 (2009); COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R 37 (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2013); 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 17 (2006). 
38. See, e.g., Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective 
Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 270, 276 (1982) (citing an 
average of forty days for parties to select an arbitrator and up to ninety days for an experienced 
arbitrator).  The time for arbitrator selection can be considerably longer if the parties fail to agree 
on an arbitrator or a party seeks to challenge a potential arbitrator’s impartiality.  See id. 
39. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 5, at 456 57 (noting that delays in arbitrator 
appointment can nullify the benefit of emergency relief). 
40. For a discussion of the recent worldwide growth of such panels and procedures, see Jason 
Fry, The Emergency Arbitrator Flawed Fashion or Sensible Solution?, 7 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 
179 (2013). 
41. Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 27, at 78 79. 
42. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 64, 65. 
43. See Gilson et al., supra note 20, at 196 98 (explaining that courts will enforce 
collaboration agreements by awarding reliance damages for failure to bargain in good faith rather 
than imposing a particular outcome, in order to encourage cooperation while recognizing that 
outcomes are unknowable and therefore uncommitted at the time of contracting). 
44. Merges speaks of the matter as one where property rights enable the parties to cope 
effectively with contractual incompleteness.  Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property 
Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1486 (2005). 
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franchise, and joint-venture agreements that we studied contained pro-
visions assigning rights to intellectual property used or developed during 
the course of the parties’ relationship.  Although retaining a right to 
intellectual property can be a form of self-help remedy, in fact a court might 
be needed to actually enforce the right. 
Although these factors can help explain why parties seek injunctive 
relief in courts, we commonly observed broader carve-out provisions that 
enabled a party to proceed in court for the resolution of entire claims.  In 
particular, parties expressed a preference for court resolution of claims 
involving noncompete and nonsolicitation clauses, confidentiality clauses, 
and intellectual property rights.  What causes parties to seek to have these 
claims resolved in courts?  Certainly the preferred remedy—typically 
injunctive relief—for claimed breaches of noncompete, nonsolicitation, and 
nondisclosure agreements remains an important part of the explanation.
45
  
In addition, courts are better able than arbitrators to provide judgments with 
in rem effect, good against the world rather than just the defendant.
46
  The 
high stakes in at least some of the cases (such as trademark disputes for 
franchisors)
47
 also are important.  Parties often prefer to have courts resolve 
“bet-the-company” cases because the availability of appellate review 
reduces the risk of aberrational decisions.
48
  Moreover, there likely are 
efficiencies to litigating claims in court once preliminary or permanent 
injunctions are sought there.
49
  Other factors, including party demand for 
clear rules and legal expertise with relatively little demand for expertise 
regarding industry norms,
50
 and the forecasted evidentiary needs of the 
parties,
51
 also could play a role. 
 
45. If parties have not agreed to arbitrate, they are not bound by the arbitrator’s decision.  
E.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
46. For a discussion of the value of in rem protections embedded in property rights, see 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
773, 780 89 (2001). 
47. Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 27, at 79 80. 
48. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 5, at 455. 
49. See Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, supra note 27, at 763 (“[P]ermitting a party 
to go to court rather than arbitrate intellectual property disputes may reduce dispute resolution 
costs and increase the accuracy of the dispute resolution process.”). 
50. One commonly cited advantage of arbitration over litigation is the ability for the parties to 
choose arbitrators with industry and other professional expertise.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET 
AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, BUSINESS TO BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 16 (2011), available at http://www 
.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf (reporting that almost 
70% of corporate counsel survey respondents listed the ability to control the arbitrator’s 
qualifications as an attribute that encourages arbitration).  In contrast, because U.S. courts operate 
according to the principles of stare decisis, litigation can provide more predictable, applicable 
legal precedents.  Thomas et al., CEO Employment Contracts, supra note 27, at 973 74. 
51. Parties typically are entitled to less discovery in arbitration than they would obtain in U.S. 
courts.  3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 34.1, at 34:2 (Supp. 1999). 
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Courts thus can provide an array of benefits to parties seeking to 
protect their innovations.  Whether those benefits outweigh any associated 
costs is an empirical question, which the next Part addresses. 
III. Party Demand for Courts: Empirical Evidence 
We share with Ted Eisenberg and Geoff Miller the view that 
examining “the actual behavior of contracting parties” can provide 
important insights into the design of legal rules and dispute resolution 
systems.
52
  In this Part, we look at how parties contract to resolve disputes 
over the legal protections for their innovations.  We examine a range of 
contract types and a variety of contract provisions, which consistently 
evidence the private value of courts in protecting innovation. 
A. Description of Contracts 
To illustrate the breadth of party preference for courts, we used 
samples of four types of contracts—technology contracts, CEO 
employment contracts, joint-venture contracts, and franchise contracts.  The 
protection (and sometimes creation) of innovation plays a critical role in 
each type of contract.  For example, one party to the technology contracts 
often licenses its innovation to the other; the licensor wants to protect its 
patent rights and trade secrets from misuse by the licensee.  As head of the 
company, a CEO presumably has access to proprietary information and 
trade secrets of his or her employer.  The CEO’s employment contract seeks 
to prevent improper disclosure of that information.  In joint-venture 
agreements, the parties may be seeking to share or develop innovations.  If 
the parties are sharing the innovation, the party with rights to the innovation 
wants to protect those rights in the contract.  If the parties are engaged in 
innovation through the joint venture, the contract may specify the rights to 
any innovation that results.  Central to the franchise relationship is the 
licensing of the franchisor’s trademark to the franchisee, often along with 
proprietary business methods.  Again, the franchisor seeks to prevent 
misuse of its innovation in the event of a dispute or after the franchise 
relationship ends. 
The technology contracts were gathered as follows: we collected a 
sample of 146 technology contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) between July 2007 and July 2011 and available on the 
 
52. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance: 
Lessons from Commercial Contracts 2 & n.8 (NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper 
No. 13 09, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241654; cf. 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 
251 52 (1979) (examining “the use of arbitration as a benchmark for evaluation of the judicial 
system”). 
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Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR).
53
  
All of the filing companies were engaged in some sort of information-
technology-related business, as identified by the four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification code for the company.  We gathered those 
contracts that seemed to represent everyday business contracts for the firm 
by eliminating contracts related to business formation and finance.
54
  We 
also eliminated duplicate contracts.  Most of the contracts (72%) were 
entered into between 2007 and 2010; the substantial majority (90%) were 
entered into between 2005 and 2011.
55
 
We also examined a sample of 915 CEO employment contracts from 
1995 to 2005 collected from EDGAR by Randall Thomas, Ken Martin, and 
Erin O’Hara O’Connor,
56
 and a small sample of joint-venture agreements 
collected from EDGAR in 2008.
57
  The majority of the joint-venture 
agreements (59.6%—31 of 52) involved joint ventures with at least one 
non-U.S. party; the others were purely domestic U.S. joint ventures.
58
 
Finally, we used a sample of 67 franchise agreements from leading 
franchisors, obtained from the website of the Minnesota Department of 
Commerce.
59
  The franchise agreements were included as exhibits to the 
franchisors’ 2013 Franchise Disclosure Documents.
60
  The sample itself 
traces from 1999, when available franchise contracts were obtained from 
franchisors then operating in Minnesota that were among the top 100 
franchisors.
61
  Originally, 75 franchisors were in the sample; due to attrition 
(franchisors going out of business, ceasing to do business in Minnesota, and 
the like) the sample is now down to 67 franchisors. 
 
53. For a more detailed description of the methodology for collecting the contracts, see 
Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 27 (manuscript at 22). 
54. The types of contracts were licensing agreements, service agreements, master service 
agreements, and the like, from the following industries: radiotelephone communications (such as 
wireless operators); telephone communications; data processing services; computer programming 
services; computer integrated systems design; computer processing and data services; and other 
business services.  Id. 
55. Id. (manuscript at 22). 
56. For more details on the methodology for collecting these contracts, see Thomas et al., 
CEO Employment Contracts, supra note 27, at 977 82. 
57. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 5, at 465 & n.143. 
58. Id. at 466 & tbl.4. 
59. Welcome to CARDS  Commerce Actions and Regulatory Documents Search, MINN. 
DEPARTMENT COM., https://www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/. 
60. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of 
Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306268. 
61. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, supra note 27, at 722 24 (describing the original 
sample); see also Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 27, at 90 91 (using 
the same Minnesota franchise agreement sample); Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60 
(manuscript at 27) (same). 
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For each of the types of contracts, we coded for whether the contract 
included an arbitration clause.  If the contract included an arbitration clause, 
we then coded for the presence of various types of carve-outs—claims for 
injunctive relief, claims for provisional relief, breach of a covenant not to 
compete, breach of a confidentiality agreement, and breach of a 
nonsolicitation agreement—and for trademark or other intellectual property 
disputes. 
For technology and franchise contracts, we also coded for the presence 
of a specific performance clause—that is, a clause by which the parties 
consent that specific performance or injunctive relief is an appropriate 
remedy.
62
  Minnesota (the source of our franchise agreements) prohibits the 
use of specific performance clauses in franchise agreements.
63
  However, 
most franchisors address such state-specific limitations through state-
specific addenda to their franchise agreements, so we do not expect the 
Minnesota prohibition to affect our results significantly.
64
  For the 
technology contracts, we identified whether the contracts discussed patent 
ownership so that we could isolate the effects of patent protection on party 
preference for courts and specific performance agreements.  We also coded 
for the presence of a choice-of-court clause, either in the contract generally 
or in connection with a carve-out. 
B. Party Demand for Courts in Contract Provisions 
Empirically, we are interested in whether parties in their contracts 
prefer arbitration or courts when seeking to protect their innovations, 
through patent, trademark, or trade secret law;
65
 and through various 
contractual provisions that enable the parties to better protect these rights.  
 
62. We coded as specific performance clauses those contract provisions by which the parties 
agreed that injunctive relief was appropriate for particular claims or that specified that certain 
behavior “would” or “will” result in irreparable harm.  We did not code as specific performance 
clauses those provisions stating that certain behavior “might” result in irreparable harm or 
provisions in which the parties agreed that no bond or only a limited bond would be required when 
a party seeks injunctive relief.  Likewise, we did not treat as a specific performance clause a 
provision stating that nothing in the contract should be construed as eliminating the possibility of 
injunctive relief.  Injunctive relief remains available under that type of provision, but under the 
usual standards for injunctive relief or specific performance in court.  It does not exhibit a 
preference for specific performance over any other remedy. 
63. Registration Checklist, MINN. DEPARTMENT COM., https://mn.gov/commerce/images/ 
Franchise_Registration_Checklist.pdf (“The following Minnesota specific language must be 
included in an exhibit attached to the Franchise Disclosure Document and also to the franchise 
agreements: . . . The franchisee cannot consent to the franchisor obtaining injunctive relief.  The 
franchisor may seek injunctive relief.  See Minn. Rules 2860.4400J.”) (emphasis omitted). 
64. Almost all of the franchisors in our sample sell franchises nationally. 
65. Copyright law apparently does not play an important role in protecting innovation in most 
of the types of contracts we studied.  The technology contracts did address copyright issues at 
times, but only in a small sample of agreements, and often in conjunction with other intellectual 
property issues.  And patent, trademark, and trade secret law may protect innovation to varying 
degrees, depending on the type of contract. 
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For each contract type, around half (or more) of the agreements studied 
included arbitration clauses—51.4% of technology contracts, 51.9% of 
CEO employment contracts, 42.9% of domestic joint-venture agreements, 
71.0% of international joint-venture agreements, and 46.3% of franchise 
contracts.
66
  The CEO employment contracts studied also showed a 
statistically significant time trend for arbitration: more parties are opting for 
arbitration over time.
67
  One might infer from these figures that parties are 
divided almost evenly in their preferences between court and arbitration, or 
may even prefer arbitration in some types of contracts, and that arbitration’s 
popularity is growing.  A closer examination of the contracts, however, 
indicates otherwise, at least for some disputes: parties exhibit a strong 
preference for courts to protect their innovation in all contracts involving 
U.S. parties, as shown by their use of carve-outs from arbitration clauses, 
choice-of-court clauses, and specific performance clauses.
68
  However, our 
contracts also indicate that the robustness of these results depends on party 
perceptions that the courts are equipped and willing to effectively enforce 
their rights.  This subpart describes our results. 
1. Carve-outs from Arbitration Clauses.—Carve-outs are provisions in 
arbitration clauses that exempt certain disputes, claims, or remedies from 
coverage under the arbitration clause.
69
  They have the effect of enabling 
the parties to seek court assistance in resolving those matters.
70
  Carve-outs 
permit parties to fine-tune their dispute resolution process by having 
different bundles of procedures (court or arbitral) apply to different types of 
disputes or remedies.
71
  By separating out the parties’ potential disputes, the 
parties can quickly obtain more effective procedural customization than 
would be possible if the same dispute-resolution process applied to all 
potential disputes.
72
  When a contract contains a carve-out from an 
 
66. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 27 (manuscript at 20, 
22, 27, 29 & tbl.9).  The technology contract numbers vary slightly here from those provided in 
Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor because more technology contracts were included in the sample 
used for this Article. 
67. Thomas et al., CEO Employment Contracts, supra note 27, at 981. 
68. The empirical findings described below on the use of carve outs and noncompete clauses 
are largely (although not exclusively) derived from our prior work.  See supra note 27.  The 
findings on choice of court clauses and specific performance clauses are original in this Article. 
69. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. The available evidence suggests that contract provisions customizing the default 
procedures in court or arbitration are rare in contracts between sophisticated parties.  See David A. 
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 394 (“[E]ven in circumstances 
where we would expect them to, parties almost never use contract terms to vary their post dispute 
procedural contests.”); O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, supra note 
27, at 136 37 (finding that parties to CEO employment contracts rarely customized arbitration 
provisions). 
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arbitration clause, the parties are expressing an explicit preference for court 
resolution of the type of dispute being carved out from arbitration.
73
 
Carve-outs were common in all of the types of contracts we studied.  
Consider the technology contracts, which were all business-to-business 
contracts.  Overall, 28.0% of the arbitration clauses studied contained 
carve-outs.  Although this is a substantial number, isolating the contracts 
entered into by one or more U.S. companies produced more significant 
results.  For contracts involving one or more U.S. companies, 59.4% of the 
arbitration clauses contained carve-outs.  In contrast, contracts between two 
non-U.S. parties—which in our sample mostly included contracts between 
two Chinese firms—contained higher rates of arbitration clauses (65.1% of 
contracts) and almost no carve-outs from arbitration (3.6% of arbitration 
clauses).  For contracts between two Chinese companies, more than 75% of 
the contracts contained arbitration clauses, and none of these contracts 
contained any carve-outs.  
About half of the CEO employment contracts with arbitration clauses 
(48.2%) contained carve-outs.  In addition, carve-outs have become 
increasingly common over time, with more recent contracts containing, on 
average, more carve-outs than the older contracts.
74
  These figures are 
instructive because carve-outs were prevalent even for firms that were not 
primarily engaged in innovation.  Whatever the proportion of firm business 
dedicated to innovation, the firm commonly sought to protect its value by 
preserving a right to proceed in court.  CEO employment contracts tend to 
be heavily negotiated agreements with lawyers representing the parties on 
both sides.
75
  This fact suggests that the protections are valuable enough to 
the firm that it is willing to actively negotiate to keep them. 
The joint-venture agreements exhibited a similar contrast.  Just over a 
quarter of the joint-venture agreements (27.6%—8 of 29) contained carve-
outs.  Within the sample, however, 20.0% of international joint ventures 
and 44.4% of U.S. joint ventures with arbitration clauses contained carve-
outs.  Finally, all of the franchise agreements we studied used some form of 
carve-out when the contract contained an arbitration clause.
76
  The franchise 
agreements are all domestic (involving only U.S. parties) and are form 
contracts drafted by the franchisor.  In virtually all cases, the carve-outs 
operate in favor of the franchisor.  
The most common carve-outs varied depending on the type of 
contract, but in every case were closely linked to the need to protect 
innovation.  In technology contracts, the most common carve-out was for 
injunctive relief claims, which appeared in 25.3% of the contracts with 
 
73. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 27 (manuscript at 16). 
74. O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, supra note 27, at 175. 
75. Thomas et al., CEO Employment Contracts, supra note 27, at 964. 
76. See infra Tables 1, 2, 3 & 4. 
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Not considering carve-outs can substantially understate the extent of 
party preferences for courts.
90
  For example, Matthew Jennejohn reports 
that 49.7% of collaboration agreements he collected from EDGAR and 
67.6% of collaboration agreements available on www.onecle.com included 
arbitration clauses.
91
  Based on this (relatively) high frequency of arbitration 
clauses, he concludes that “collaborators shun litigation,” arguing that 
“contemporary contract adjudication is fundamentally inappropriate for 
fixing dysfunctional learning systems.”
92
  We have no ability to replicate 
the sample Jennejohn collected from EDGAR, but have examined the 
sample of collaboration agreements currently available on 
www.onecle.com.  Of the available agreements dated 2004–2008 (the most 
recent agreements available), just under half (48.0%—12 of 25) included 
arbitration clauses.  But half of the collaboration agreements with 
arbitration clauses (including three-quarters of domestic agreements) used 
some sort of carve-out, most commonly for provisional relief.
93
  So 
focusing solely on arbitration clauses to the exclusion of carve-outs can 
substantially understate the extent to which parties contract for courts to 
assist them in resolving their disputes. 
2. Choice-of-Court Clauses.—Why do parties so often prefer courts to 
arbitration for the protection of their innovation?  Recall that our instinct 
was that property-type protections are essential for the effective protection 
of information and innovation, and that courts can more effectively provide 
these remedies than can arbitrators.
94
  Can the contracts provide us with any 
evidence of this motivation?  In an effort to seek out this evidence, we 
studied some of the contracts for the presence of choice-of-court and 
specific performance clauses.  We treat the choice-of-court clauses in this 
subpart and the specific performance clauses in the next subpart. 
If the parties seek courts in order to provide property-type protections, 
then they should be less inclined to specify an exclusive venue for the 
resolution of their disputes.  This reasoning requires some defense because, 
at first glance, specifying a particular court should serve the benefit of 
enabling the parties to steer away from unreliable courts (i.e., Chinese and 
California courts as described in the last subpart)
95
 and toward more reliable 
 
90. In addition to the example that follows, see also infra text accompanying notes 100 04 
(discussing Eisenberg & Miller’s study of specific performance clauses). 
91. Jennejohn, supra note 23, at 198, 200. 
92. Id. at 201. 
93. We are dealing with a different issue in this Article than the one discussed by Jennejohn, 
and we certainly recognize that arbitration can play an important role in resolving some sorts of 
disputes among collaborators.  But like the other types of contracts we studied, collaboration 
agreements also appear to provide for an important role for courts in protecting innovation. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 34 51. 
95. See infra text accompanying notes 109 18. 
        
2194 Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:2177 
 
ones.  Although this is true, a party seeking to prevent another party from 
expropriating information ‌or innovation likely would not wish to confine 
itself to a single jurisdiction.  Rather, that party presumably would want the 
freedom to seek injunctive relief in any jurisdiction where the other party is 
attempting to benefit from use of the information or innovation, at least 
where the location of such expropriations cannot be reliably predicted.  
Stronger courts are better than unreliable courts, to be sure, but a party 
seeking injunctive relief nevertheless could prefer to choose its jurisdiction 
after the facts of expropriation have been revealed. 
If this reasoning is correct, it has implications for the choice-of-court 
clauses one might see in our contracts.  Specifically, we compared the use 
of the clauses in the two settings where the parties contemplate using courts 
for the resolution of at least some of their disputes: (1) contracts without 
arbitration clauses and (2) contracts containing arbitration clauses with 
carve-outs.  For the latter contracts, the parties have explicitly contemplated 
a need for courts to protect their information and innovation.  For the 
former contracts, the parties’ motivation presumably is much less clear.  
Parties could choose not to incorporate an arbitration clause for many 
reasons, including a failure or reluctance to bargain for dispute resolution, 
or a distrust of arbitration for any number of reasons.  If parties seek courts 
in order to obtain property-type protections for their innovation, then 
choice-of-court clauses should appear less often in contracts that explicitly 
carve out rights to go to court for such claims.  Conversely, they should 
appear relatively more often in contracts with no arbitration clause because 
those contracting parties might or might not be motivated by concerns for 
protection of innovation. 
Using this reasoning, we returned to the technology contracts to study 
choice-of-court clauses, and we found a dramatic difference in the rates 
with which contracts incorporated choice-of-court clauses.  For the 21 
contracts with arbitration clauses and carve-outs, only 2 (9.5%) included a 
choice-of-court clause limiting a party’s right to obtain relief in a particular 
court or courts.
96
  In contrast, 39 of the 71 (54.9%) contracts without an 
arbitration clause contained a choice-of-court provision.  These differential 
numbers cannot prove our hypothesis, but they certainly support it.  
Moreover, several of the 37 choice-of-court clauses found in the contracts 
without arbitration clauses gave the parties a clear or possible right to 
proceed to any court to obtain injunctive relief.  These provisions serve as 
carve-outs of the choice-of-court clauses, presumably to ensure that the 
 
96. Actually, a third contract contained a type of choice of court clause, but we chose not to 
count this contract.  The contracting parties were both U.S. companies, and the contract gave the 
parties the right to proceed in any U.S. court.  We viewed this clause as permissive rather than 
restrictive, given the circumstances. 
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parties can more effectively obtain property-type relief for the protection of 
their innovation. 
Moreover, virtually all of the contracts designating a U.S. forum 
specify that the parties can proceed in state or federal court in a particular 
state or district.  Presumably, the choice enables the parties to obtain more 
effective IP protections in federal courts (i.e., for patent, trademark, and 
copyright claims) while preserving a right to proceed in state court for the 
resolution of other types of claims. 
3. Specific Performance Clauses.—Another indicator of the im-
portance to parties of property-type protections is the presence of contract 
clauses modifying the usual rules for awarding injunctive relief or specific 
performance.  In particular, contract clauses will sometimes state that the 
parties acknowledge or agree that in the event of a breach of the contract 
provision, the nonbreaching party is likely to suffer irreparable injury and 
that injunctive relief is therefore appropriate.
97
  The clauses are an effort to 
ensure that courts will be willing to award injunctive relief without the 
usual extensive inquiry into whether the legal standard is satisfied.
98
  A 
recent paper by Ted Eisenberg and Geoff Miller examines the use of 
“specific performance clauses” to evaluate party preferences for a specific 
performance remedy over damages.
99
  Our focus here is narrower: we are 
interested in contract provisions that help explain why parties prefer courts 
to arbitration for injunctive relief remedies.  Nevertheless, our findings do 
have possible implications for some of Eisenberg and Miller’s findings. 
We looked for the presence of specific performance clauses in the 
technology contracts.  Although we found several such provisions, their 
presence was almost exclusively a U.S. phenomenon.  When at least one of 
the parties to the contract was located in the United States, 53.6% (45 of 84) 
of the contracts included a specific performance clause.  When neither party 
was located in the United States, only 1.6% (1 of 62) of the contracts 
included a specific performance clause.  Of the 46 contracts with specific 
performance clauses, 27 (58.7%) provided that all disputes will be resolved 
in court (no arbitration clause), 14 (30.4%) included an arbitration clause 
with a carve-out, and only 5 (10.9%) provided for arbitration with no carve-
out.  By comparison, 49 of the 100 (49.0%) contracts without a specific 
performance clause included an arbitration clause with no carve-out.  
Moreover, specific performance clauses were more common in contracts 
that contained arbitration clauses with carve-outs than in contracts with no 
arbitration clause.  Twenty-seven of the 71 contracts with no arbitration 
clause (38.0%) contained specific performance clauses, whereas 14 of the 
 
97. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 52, at 3 5. 
98. Id. at 3 4. 
99. Id. at 2 6. 
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21 contracts with carve-outs (66.7%) contained specific performance 
clauses.  Given that the contracts contemplating dispute resolution in court 
are significantly more likely to contain specific performance clauses, the 
technology contracts lend further support to the hypothesis that U.S. parties 
desire courts in order to seek property-type protections. 
Of the franchise agreements we studied, 59.7% (40 of 67) included a 
specific performance clause.  Specific performance clauses were more 
common in franchise agreements without arbitration clauses (66.7%—24 of 
36) than franchise agreements with arbitration clauses (51.6%—16 of 31).  
However, all but two of the franchise agreements with arbitration clauses 
and specific performance clauses (87.5%—14 of 16) also used injunctive 
relief carve-outs.  And the two remaining franchise agreements had carve-
outs for disputes over trademarks (in one case) and disputes over 
trademarks and confidential information (in the other), which were the very 
types of disputes addressed by the specific performance clause.  All told, all 
of the forty franchise agreements with specific performance clauses either 
had no arbitration clause or an arbitration clause with a carve-out.  In all of 
the agreements, it would be courts rather than arbitrators that would rule on 
the request for injunctive relief. 
Moreover, the specific performance clauses in the franchise 
agreements studied consistently linked the need for injunctive relief to 
protections for trademarks, trade secrets, and confidential information.  
Here are a few examples: 
! AAMCO: “in view of the nature of the System, the business 
of AAMCO, and the strength of the AAMCO names and 
marks.” 
! Cost Cutters: “The FRANCHISEE, the FRANCHISEE’S 
shareholders, partners or members and the Personal 
Guarantors agree that the provisions of this Article are 
necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of 
COST CUTTERS and COST CUTTERS’ franchisees, 
including, without limitation, preventing damage to and/ ‌or 
loss of goodwill associated with the Marks, preventing the 
unauthorized dissemination of marketing, promotional and 
other confidential information to competitors of COST 
CUTTERS and COST CUTTERS’ franchisees, protection of 
COST CUTTERS’ trade secrets and the integrity of COST 
CUTTERS’ Business System and preventing duplication of 
the Business System.” 
! Denny’s: “the unique value and secondary meaning attached 
to the Denny’s System, the Denny’s Marks, the Confidential 
Information and the associated standards of operation and 
trade practices.” 
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! Dunkin’ Donuts: “the importance of your compliance with 
Standards to protect our System, other franchisees, and the 
goodwill enjoyed by our Proprietary Marks.” 
! KFC: “as a KFC franchisee, he will have access to KFC’s 
trade secrets and confidential practices and therefore, is in a 
unique position to use the special knowledge he will have 
gained while a franchisee.” 
! Quizno’s: “the Marks and the Licensed Methods have 
valuable goodwill attached to them, that their protection and 
maintenance are essential to Franchisor and its affiliates.” 
The specific performance clauses themselves thus provide some indication 
that injunctive relief is important for protecting innovation. 
Our empirical results stand in sharp contrast to those of Eisenberg and 
Miller, who found that specific performance clauses were more common in 
contracts with arbitration clauses than ones without.
100
  There are several 
possible explanations for our differing findings.  First, our studies use 
different contracts.  The technology contracts would be included in the 
Eisenberg and Miller sample, but the franchise agreements would not.  And 
the Eisenberg and Miller sample included a number of other types of 
contracts we do not study here.
101
  Second, and importantly, Eisenberg and 
Miller do not distinguish between arbitration clauses with injunctive relief 
carve-outs and arbitration clauses without such carve-outs.
102
  Such carve-
outs indicate that the specific performance clauses are directed to courts 
rather than arbitrators, as Eisenberg and Miller presume.
103
  Third, 
Eisenberg and Miller appear to employ a significantly broader definition of 
specific performance clause than we use here.  They employ a relatively 
simple word search that will capture more than just specific performance 
clauses, whereas we had few enough contracts that we could read each one 
to be certain that it contained such a clause.
104
  Overall, our findings here do 
 
100. Id. at 38 tbl.7. 
101. Compare id. at 22 tbl.1 (sampling twelve types of contracts, including employment, 
merger, and underwriting contracts), with discussion supra subpart III(A) (sampling technology 
contracts, CEO employment contracts, joint venture contracts, and franchise contracts). 
102. See id. at 29 30. 
103. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 27 (manuscript at 
40). 
104. As explained above, we do not include injunctive relief carve outs, no bond 
requirements, or no waiver of injunctive relief provisions as specific performance clauses.  See 
supra note 62.  By comparison, it appears that Eisenberg and Miller may include some of those 
provisions.  They describe their coding of specific performance clauses as follows: 
The key outcome variable in this study is the contracts’ treatment of remedies, with 
particular focus on the remedy commonly referred to as specific performance.  To 
determine whether a contract included specific performance as a remedy, we used 
terms associated with departures from the default damages rule.  We searched the 
retrieved SEC documents for the following terms: “specific!, injunc!, irre! (to capture 
Irreparable and Irrevocable), adequate, equit!, remedies, relief.”  The “!” symbol in 
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not fundamentally challenge the central finding of Eisenberg and Miller 
(that parties often contract for specific performance), but they do raise 
questions about Eisenberg and Miller’s subsidiary finding that such 
provisions are more common in contracts with arbitration clauses. 
4. Patent Protection Versus Other Protection of Innovation.—The 
different contracts that we studied protect innovation through different 
bodies of intellectual property.  The franchise agreements seem primarily 
focused on trademark protection, while the CEO employment contracts 
focus more on trade secret protection.  We wanted to get a sense of how 
contract provisions might differ if the parties were focused on patent 
protection rather than other types of protection.  Patent disputes are not 
arbitrable in all countries,
105
 and scholars debate whether it makes sense for 
such cases to be handled in arbitration.
106
  Moreover, one might think that 
patent cases are more likely to end up in public court than trademark and 
trade secret cases for several reasons, including that parties to patent 
disputes can file suit in specialized courts with expert judges,
107
 and that the 
intellectual property at issue is already in the public domain, so the 
confidentiality of arbitration is less necessary.
108
 
To get a sense of how parties treat patent issues, we returned to the 
technology contracts.  Not all of these contracts contemplate the protection 
of innovation, let alone patent issues, however.  We isolated those contracts 
that discussed patent-ownership issues as a measure of those parties who 
were particularly focused on patent issues when negotiating the contract.  In 
the seventy-seven contracts discussing patent ownership between the 
parties, twenty-four (31.2%) specified that all disputes were to be resolved 
in arbitration, thirty-four (44.2%) that all disputes were to be resolved in 
court, and nineteen (24.7%) included an arbitration clause with a carve-out 
 
some of the search terms is the commonly used symbol to include any combination 
of characters that follow the root term.  For example, “injunc!” would include 
documents that contain the words “injunction” or “injunctive”.  Documents that 
satisfied the search term were then read to ascertain whether they in fact addressed 
specific performance. 
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 52, at 23.  They recognize the possibility that their search terms 
are underinclusive and add some contract provisions that have a similar effect as a specific 
performance clause.  Id. at 23 24.  But they do not discuss the possibility that their search terms 
are overinclusive. 
105. M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 333, 345 (2006) (listing France and China as examples of countries 
where patent disputes are non arbitrable). 
106. See id. at 306 13 (addressing legal and policy arguments against arbitration proceedings 
for patent disputes). 
107. See infra text accompanying notes 132 37. 
108. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 95 (2003) (explaining that patent law requires public 
disclosure of the relevant invention). 
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for some disputes.  By comparison, in the sixty-nine technology contracts 
that did not discuss patent ownership issues, thirty (43.5%) specified that all 
disputes were to be resolved in arbitration, thirty-seven (53.6%) that all 
disputes were to be resolved in court, and two (2.9%) included an 
arbitration clause with a carve-out for some disputes.  As these figures 
indicate, contracts that expressly contemplate patent matters tend to steer 
parties away from arbitration and toward courts, at least to some extent.  
The differences are not dramatic, however, which further reinforces our 
observations from other contracts that parties seek courts for innovation 
protections more generally.  Interestingly, however, the parties were much 
more likely to incorporate carve-outs from arbitration in contracts 
discussing patent rights.  Perhaps the parties see patent matters as 
significantly more unique and separable than matters that involve other 
forms of intellectual property.  This makes intuitive sense, given that trade 
secrets are protected through a variety of common contract terms, in-
cluding noncompete, confidentiality, nonsolicitation, and benefits/severance 
clauses. 
Parties contemplating the need for patent protections might also seek 
courts due to the special value of injunctive relief for patent owners.  In 
support of this hypothesis, technology contracts that discuss patent 
ownership issues are much more likely to include specific performance 
clauses than are the contracts that do not discuss patent-ownership rights.  
Just over half (51.9%—40 of 77) of contracts discussing patent rights 
include specific performance clauses, while less than ten percent (8.7%—
6 of 69) of contracts that do not discuss patent ownership include such 
clauses. 
5. Desirability of Courts.—Our contracts provide evidence that party 
preference for courts is critically dependent on the parties believing that 
courts can, and will, provide them with the protections they seek.  If parties 
do not trust the courts to provide them with effective protections, then they 
will be more inclined to opt for arbitration and less inclined to carve out 
claims for court resolution.  This pattern is present in the technology 
agreements entered into between two companies located in China.  Of the 
forty-nine contracts involving two companies formed in China, thirty-eight 
(77.6%), of them contain an arbitration clause, and none of the arbitration 
clauses contain carve-outs of any kind.  Thus, at most, 22.4% of contracting 
parties are comfortable proceeding to court for the resolution of their 
disputes, a much lower number than we saw for other contracts.  Although 
China recently has invested significant resources in IP courts, they are not 
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yet thought to be effective for protecting IP rights.
109
  This relative distrust 
of the local courts shows up in the parties’ contracts. 
The CEO employment contracts also are illustrative.  Firms in our 
sample were located across the United States, with 112 of the contracts in 
our sample primarily located in California, according to the Compustat 
database.
110
  California courts will not enforce noncompete provisions in 
employment contracts.
111
  Given that noncompetition clauses were 
commonly found in the CEO employment contracts, one might expect to 
see a difference in California firm preferences for arbitration relative to 
firms located in other states.  In fact, 67% of the CEO employment 
contracts with firms primarily located in California contained arbitration 
clauses, a much higher rate than that found for the other firms (49%), with 
the differences being statistically significant.
112
  Statistically significant 
differences showed up in the carve-out rates too.  Very few firms primarily 
located in California signed contracts carving out noncompete-clause claims 
for court resolution.
113
  That result seems to follow straightforwardly from 
the fact that California firms’ noncompete-clause claims can only be 
enforced in arbitration.
114
  Interestingly, however, firms primarily located in 
California were also statistically less likely to carve out other types of 
claims for court resolution.
115
  This difference might well be due to the fact 
that the California courts will strike down arbitration clauses in their 
entirety in employment contracts if it appears that the employer is carving 
out rights to proceed in court while forcing the employee to bring claims in 
arbitration.
116
  This precedent has even been applied both to cases where 
 
109. See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 27 (manuscript at 
42) (discussing the difficulties faced by specialized intellectual property courts in China). 
110. O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, supra note 27, at 161. 
111. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Convenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607 08 
(1999). 
112. O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, supra note 27, at 161 62. 
113. Id. at 170 (non California firms carved the noncompete clause claims out in 38% of the 
arbitration clauses; California firms carved them out in only 5% of the clauses). 
114. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
115. O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, supra note 27, at 168 
tbl.6. 
116. For examples of cases in which the entirety of an arbitration clause was struck down by a 
California court, see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 
2000); Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Martinez v. Master Prot. 
Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 422, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); O’Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 
125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002). 
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employers carve out rights to innovation
117
 and to cases involving corporate 
officers and executives.
118
 
The California firm CEO employment agreements and the Chinese 
firm technology agreements both provide evidence that party preference for 
courts is contingent on their subjective belief that the courts can, and will, 
provide them with the protections they seek.  If firms opt for courts in 
general but turn to arbitration when court enforcement is unreliable, it is 
possible that the court precedent is having the effect of destroying value for 
the contracting parties.  Such value destruction is only justified if the state 
can identify a greater social benefit to its obstructive stance.  Overall, it 
suggests that states should very carefully consider how local laws influence 
party efforts to protect their information and innovation. 
C. Summary 
To summarize, empirical studies of contracting for dispute resolution 
have overlooked the fact that parties seeking to protect their rights to 
innovation appear to have a strong preference for courts rather than 
arbitration.  In a wide variety of commercial environments where parties 
seek to use a number of different tools for protecting innovation (such as 
patents, trademarks, and trade secrets), a preference for courts appears in 
the contracts.  One must be careful not to generalize from our contract 
studies too far.  After all, we study high-value contracts entered into by 
mostly publicly traded firms, which may give some bias to our results.
119
  
Nevertheless, across these several environments studied, the preference for 
courts is clear.  Often this preference takes the form of carve-outs from 
arbitration clauses, a phenomenon receiving scant attention so far in the 
literature.  When the parties focus on carve-outs, they are reluctant to 
specify the courts where such relief can be obtained, presumably so that the 
protections can be obtained anywhere.  In contrast to prior study,
120
 we find 
that specific performance clauses are more prevalent when parties 
contemplate court protection of innovation, providing further evidence that 
a primary benefit of courts is more effective injunctive relief.  Finally, in 
the technology agreements, parties contemplating a need for patent 
 
117. For examples of cases in which the entirety of an arbitration clause was struck down by a 
California court despite the employer carving out rights to innovation, see supra note 116. 
118. See, e.g., Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(relating to an arbitration provision in an employment contract between a corporation and its 
president and chief executive officer); Kalmbach v. Sportsmobile W., Inc., No. F054648, 2008 
WL 4988663, at *1, *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008) (relating to an arbitration agreement in the 
contract of a vice president of operations); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 148 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (relating to an arbitration provision in an employment contract between a 
corporation and chief financial officer). 
119. Cf. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 5, at 457 67 (detailing how Eisenberg and Miller’s 
sample is biased “in favor of contracts unlikely to include arbitration clauses”). 
120. See supra notes 100 04 and accompanying text. 
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protections were even more likely to express a preference for courts over 
arbitration, were more likely to use carve-outs to preserve such rights, and 
were significantly more likely to incorporate specific performance clauses 
than were other parties.  Our contracts indicate that party preference for 
courts is highly contingent, however, turning on party perceptions of the 
ability and willingness of the courts to provide effective protection of their 
innovations. 
IV. Implications for Court Rules 
Whatever might be true regarding the relevance of courts in other 
commercial contexts, they appear to be important to many parties 
attempting to protect their information and innovation.  In a world where 
these attributes represent an increasing fraction of the value of 
transactions,
121
 the role of courts in commercial exchange should grow 
rather than shrink over time.  Importantly, however, party demand for 
courts is not wholly inelastic; our empirical studies demonstrate that parties 
located in jurisdictions with courts that provide weak protections for 
innovation are more likely than other parties to opt for arbitration.
122
  Put 
differently, where court rules or procedures interfere with parties’ ability to 
protect their innovation, parties will do what they can to avoid them. 
If courts desire to provide value to contracting parties, thereby 
facilitating transactions involving innovation, then particular attention 
should be paid to the procedural and substantive rules that are applied to 
claims involving the protection of innovation.  In particular, the data 
suggests that nations wishing to compete effectively for technologically 
sophisticated investments must do more than credibly commit to enforcing 
arbitration clauses and awards.  Court reforms are likely essential. 
What will matter to contracting parties are the rules and standards 
applied to the granting of injunctive relief, as well as the substantive 
doctrines most likely to affect contracting parties, particularly the ability of 
parties to contract for innovation protections.  This point requires a bit of 
elaboration here.  Outside the context of enforcing contract terms, 
arbitrators very typically apply the same governing rules that are used by 
courts,
123
 so at first glance it is not clear that the substantive legal principles 
applied in courts would drive parties to arbitration.  Where the substantive 
rules are influenced by contract law principles, however, the results in the 
 
121. See, e.g., Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the 
Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 280 (2004) 
(“Intellectual property has been recognized as the most valuable asset in many commercial 
transactions . . . .”). 
122. See supra section III(B)(5). 
123. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 214 
(2006) (“The attitudes of arbitrators toward following the law do not appear all that different from 
the attitudes of judges . . . .”). 
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two forums can differ.  The issue is essentially a matter of contract 
enforceability.  In arbitration, the parties’ contract is paramount,
124
 but for 
courts, governing legal principles are more likely to trump the contract.
125
 
For example, a court in jurisdiction X might insist on the application of 
X law to the parties’ claim, whereas an arbitrator is more likely to apply the 
law of jurisdiction Y if the parties state in their contract that Y law is to 
apply.  Even when it is clear that X law will generally apply, parties 
sometimes attempt to contract for an effective alteration of the legal 
standard.  Consider, for example, noncompete clauses.  The general rule is 
that an employee is free to take up any alternative work once she leaves a 
firm, but a noncompete clause is an attempt to contract around the 
employee’s freedom to prevent the loss of trade secrets or other proprietary 
information.
126
  Some, but not all, courts will enable parties to contract for 
this protection.
127
  Consider also the standard for obtaining an injunction.  
Parties might attempt to incorporate a different standard into their contract, 
or, as we observed in our contracts, they might contract for terms that 
suggest one party automatically concedes that the standard, or at least part 
of its factors, is satisfied.
128
  If courts are more reluctant to enforce these 
provisions, parties may be driven to arbitration, which deprives them of the 
benefits to court resolution of their disputes. 
We do not mean to suggest that courts should enforce party contracts 
related to innovation regardless of what the contracts say and of the policy 
goals embedded in the generally applicable rules.  Instead, our assertion is 
more modest: courts should pay careful attention to the rules that they craft 
in the context of innovation because they can entail underappreciated 
economic costs.  By driving parties to arbitration or otherwise making it 
more difficult for them to protect their innovation, less innovation, less 
value-enhancing trade, or both, might result.  These costs are less 
significant in other commercial contexts—i.e., contexts not involving 
innovation—where arbitration serves as an effective substitute to court 
resolution of disputes. 
Given that we are not ourselves experts in intellectual property, we 
must leave to others a full debate over the policy implications of our 
empirical findings.  We mention here just a few matters that seem to be 
worthy of further consideration.  First, courts and legislators should 
 
124. Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and 
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 569 (2003) 
(highlighting that arbitrators may be more likely to enforce contractual punitive damages 
restrictions than courts). 
125. See id. 
126. Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, Privacy and Firms, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 526, 530 
(2002). 
127. Id. 
128. See supra section III(B)(3). 
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consider whether it makes sense to set up courts with special expertise in IP 
matters.  Within the United States, the Maryland Business and Technology 
Court is an example.
129
  In addition, some have proposed specialized patent 
trial courts within the United States whose conclusions would be entitled to 
deference in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
130
  In the 
United Kingdom, the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (located in 
London) hears patent, copyright, and trademark claims.
131
  In addition to 
providing specialized judges, the court applies special rules designed to 
enable more effective case management and lower cost assessments.
132
 
One of the advantages of arbitration is that parties can pick arbitrators 
with expertise in the subject matter of their dispute,
133
 and specialized 
courts can replicate (to some extent at least) that capability for courts.  It 
certainly is the case that states and judges are setting up business courts, in 
part, in response to perceived competition from arbitration.
134
  That said, 
none of the contracts we studied specifically contracted for disputes to be 
resolved in a specialized business or technology court, which at least raises 
questions about their perceived value to parties.  However, one explanation 
for a failure to designate specific courts is a desire to obtain injunctive relief 
wherever necessary to protect the innovation.
135
  Regarding expert judges, 
parties to contracts that contemplate patent actions—which are more 
commonly resolved by expert judges
136
—seem more likely to choose courts 
rather than arbitration to resolve those claims.  At the very least, more 
careful study of party preferences seems warranted.
137
 
 
129. See John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1915, 1969 (2012) (describing specialized courts created under the Maryland Business and 
Technology Case Management Program). 
130. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 877, 877 79 (2002). 
131. Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (Formerly Patents County Court), HM COURTS 
& TRIBUNALS SERV., JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj rolls building/intellectual
property enterprise court (last updated Jan. 9, 2014).  This court was formerly called the Patents 
County Court, which was established in 1990.  HM COURTS & TRIBUNAL SERV., THE PATENTS 
COUNTY COURT GUIDE 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/ 
patents court/patents court guide.pdf. 
132. Sarah Cook, Patents County Court Restructures to Become the Intellectual Property 
Enterprise Court, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/x/267172/Trademark/Patents+County+ 
Court+Restructures+To+Become+The+Intellectual+Property+Enterprise+Court (last updated 
Oct. 4, 2013); How the PCC Became A Global Player, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Mar. 25, 
2013), http://www.managingip.com/Article/3179044/How the PCC became a global player.html. 
133. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
134. Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 492 (2009). 
135. See supra section III(B)(2). 
136. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
137. We also note that specialized courts may be less valuable if they create too much 
centralized decision making.  See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent 
Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620 25 (2007) (arguing that deficits in 
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In addition, our findings suggest that courts should avoid adopting 
rules that make a judicial forum less attractive than arbitration, or at least 
they should proceed with a keen awareness of the consequences of their 
decisions.  If courts adopt rules less favorable to protecting innovation, and 
if parties can replicate the more favorable rules in arbitration, parties will 
likely switch to arbitration—but at the cost of using a less preferred means 
of dispute resolution.  The following are examples of rules that might have 
such an effect. 
! Court decisions refusing to enforce or giving only limited 
effect to specific performance clauses.  Although some 
courts give full effect to specific performance clauses,
138
 
others do not, requiring the party seeking injunctive relief 
nonetheless to prove that it will likely suffer irreparable 
harm.
139
  This disagreement has taken on renewed 
significance in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
140
  eBay 
involved a patent infringement case in which the Federal 
Circuit employed a presumption of irreparable harm.
141
  The 
Supreme Court rejected the use of the presumption in this 
context, holding that the party seeking injunctive relief must 
 
decisions of the Federal Circuit can be traced to the fact that no other U.S. courts compete with it 
in deciding cases); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription 
for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 660 61 (2009) (same).  
Here, we contemplate the possibility of multiple specialized courts available to the parties. 
138. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1226 
(Del. 2012) (explaining that Delaware “courts have long held that ‘contractual stipulations as to 
irreparable harm alone suffice to establish that element for the purpose of issuing . . . injunctive 
relief’”). 
139. See, e.g., Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1264 
(10th Cir. 2004) (refusing to make findings of irreparable harm based solely on the breach of an 
exclusivity provision); Smith, Bucklin & Assocs., Inc. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 478, 481 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (stating that a noncompete contractual provision alone is insufficient to show 
irreparable harm); Baker’s Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 830 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(same); Riverside Publ’g Co. v. Mercer Publ’g LLC, No. C11 1249RAJ, 2011 WL 3420421, at *8 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2011) (“giv[ing] little weight to the clause in the Settlement Agreement that 
pre declares that any breach of the Agreement will result in irreparable harm” and holding that the 
clause “does not relieve Riverside of its obligation to demonstrate irreparable harm”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a (1981) (“Because the availability of 
equitable relief was historically viewed as a matter of jurisdiction, the parties cannot vary by 
agreement the requirement of inadequacy of damages, although a court may take appropriate 
notice of facts recited in their contract.”); 1 COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: STRATEGIES FOR 
DRAFTING & NEGOTIATING § 11.06[A], at 11 37 (Vladimir R. Rossman & Morton Moskin eds., 
2d ed. 2013) (“Parties may include a clause providing for the remedy of specific performance in 
their contract. However, whether a court will honor that contract provision will depend on the 
jurisdiction.”); Frederick A. Brodie & Nathan R. Smith, The False Promise of Injunction Clauses, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 2009, at 92, 94 (“The net result: contract language cannot create 
a right to injunctive relief when an injunction would otherwise be inappropriate.”). 
140. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
141. Id. at 393 94. 
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prove irreparable harm through the factors traditionally 
considered in this context.
142
  Since eBay, lower courts have 
applied the Court’s reasoning to a broad array of contractual 
and intellectual property contexts.
143
  In all of these 
contexts, then, the question arises whether a moving party 
must prove irreparable harm even in the face of a contract 
clause that states that the nonmoving party concedes that 
irreparable harm would result.  Given that arbitrators are not 
bound to award the same remedies that courts would award 
in the same circumstances, an arbitrator may be more likely 
to enforce a specific performance clause than would a court.  
And if an arbitrator did so, a court would almost certainly 
enforce the resulting arbitral award.
144
  However, the 
consequent delay (in the context of provisional relief), the 
need for possible ex post court enforcement, and the 
uncertainty regarding court enforcement can all impose 
significant costs on the party needing protection. 
! Court restrictions on the ability of parties to contract for 
damages (in addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief).  
Given the difficulty of proving damages for breaches of 
intellectual property rights,
145
 parties might wish to specify a 
dollar value of harm in the event of certain contract 
breaches.  This contracting technique might be especially 
valuable to parties who contemplate degradation of a 
trademark or limited unauthorized use of copyrighted or 
patented materials after the expiration of a contract term.  
Courts vary in their attitude toward when liquidated 
damages are “reasonable.”
146
  Moreover, in the context of 
 
142. Id. at 394. 
143. See Ronald T. Coleman  Jr. et al., Applicability of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm 
After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 4 9 (2012) (discussing how lower federal courts have 
interpreted eBay in the context of other intellectual property fields and specifically in the context 
of franchise litigation); Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The 
Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 214 15 (2012) (noting how lower 
federal courts have applied eBay to subject matter as diverse as federal constitutional law and state 
tort law). 
144. EDWARD YORIO & STEVE THEL, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
AND INJUNCTIONS § 19.4, at 19 14 to 18 (2d ed. Supp. 2013). 
145. See supra notes 35 36 and accompanying text. 
146. On the reasonableness standard and applicable factors, see U.C.C. § 2 718 (2011); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981).  On differing approaches to the 
enforcement of liquidated damages clauses, see Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed 
Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 504 09 (1962) (surveying general differences); Douglas R. 
Hafer & Logan W. Simmons, Lost Future Royalties: Lessons From Recent Decisions, 31 
FRANCHISE L.J. 150, 154 55 (2012) (discussing different perspectives on the enforceability of 
liquidated damages provisions to cover lost future royalties after termination of a franchise 
agreement). 
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covenants not to compete, courts differ in the extent to 
which liquidated damages provisions
147
 are enforceable in 
the event of a breach of the covenant.
148
 
! Rules treating the enforceability of contract provisions 
attempting to circumvent the impact of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
149
  In 
Genentech, the Court ruled that a licensee under a currently 
effective license agreement had standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the 
patent.
150
  Prior to Genentech, many thought such suits were 
not permitted unless the licensee first repudiated the 
agreement.
151
  In the aftermath of the opinion, questions 
have arisen regarding the extent to which licensors can 
contract around the opinion to effectively defeat patent 
validity challenges by current licensees.
152
  Examples 
include the enforceability of agreements that expressly 
forbid the licensee to challenge the patent as well as contract 
provisions that cancel or change the terms of contracts in the 
event that the licensee brings suit.
153
 
 The Second Circuit has recently held that pre-litigation 
agreements prohibiting a licensee from challenging a 
patent’s validity are void as against public policy.
154
  The 
policy concern includes ensuring that there is a venue 
available for an effective challenge to an invalid patent.
155
  
 
147. Liquidated damages are common contractual remedies for breach of a noncompetition 
clause.  Blase Indus. Corp. v. Anorad Corp., 442 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 2006). 
148. Some courts hostile to specific enforcement of covenants not to compete are similarly 
hostile to liquidated damages clauses for breach of the covenant.  See, e.g., Cherry, Bekaert & 
Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 505 06 (Ala. 1991) (holding that what amounted to a 
noncompete clause in a partnership agreement was unenforceable in an action for liquidated 
damages against professionals under Alabama law); Junkin v. Ne. Ark. Internal Med. Clinic, 42 
S.W.3d 432, 437 38 (Ark. 2001) (expressing similar concerns).  Others see enforcement of 
liquidated damages provisions as a compromise means for enabling an employer or franchisor to 
protect its investments.  Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 154 (Cal. 1993); Robert W. Emerson, 
Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1049, 1098 1100 (1995). 
149. 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
150. Id. at 137. 
151. Repudiating licensees were permitted to challenge a patent’s validity after Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 71 (1969) (rejecting the doctrine of licensee estoppel that a licensee 
operating under a license agreement could not challenge the validity of the licensor’s patent as 
being inconsistent with federal policy). 
152. For a discussion of these issues, see generally Alfred C. Server & Peter Singleton, 
Licensee Patent Validity Challenges Following MedImmune: Implications for Patent Licensing, 3 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 243 (2011). 
153. Id. at 403 36. 
154. Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2012). 
155. Id. at 171. 
        
2208 Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:2177 
 
Given the social costs of the monopoly right embedded in a 
patent,
156
 it does make sense for courts to protect third 
parties where necessary.  On the other hand, unduly 
restrictive approaches could drive parties to arbitration and 
away from courts.  A compromise position may be worth 
serious consideration here. 
! Rules that limit the duration of the enforceability of 
provisions that apply after the expiration of the contract—
i.e., in the context of trade secret protections.  Consider for 
example, noncompete clauses, under which an employee or 
purchaser of a business agrees not to work for or operate a 
competing business for some period of time after the 
contract period.
157
  Not all states will enforce these 
provisions in the context of employment,
158
 and as the 
California CEO employment contracts indicate, this legal 
rule influences party demand for arbitration.  The same 
could be true for states that enforce the provisions only if the 
restrictions apply for a short period of time.  States often 
will enforce such provisions if reasonable in geographic 
scope and duration,
159
 but the critical question is what 
counts as “reasonable.” 
! Uncertainties due to Federal Circuit review of claim 
construction rulings.  The Federal Circuit applies a de novo 
standard for reviewing district court rulings on claim 
construction in patent cases,
160
 resulting in a high reversal 
rate (historically, at least) and much duplication of cost and 
effort.
161
  By comparison, the grounds for reviewing arbitral 
awards are much more limited, with little or no court review 
of the merits of the arbitrator’s award.
162
  Accordingly, 
 
156. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 108, at 300. 
157. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 126, at 530. 
158. Id. 
159. 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 13:5, at 197 (4th ed. 2009). 
160. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]s a purely 
legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact based 
questions relating to claim construction.”). 
161. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005); 
Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  
215, 232 34 (2007); Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: 
A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
711, 745 46 (2003). 
162. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).  Some courts review awards for manifest disregard of the law (i.e., 
the arbitrators knowingly refused to follow the law in making the award), but other courts have 
rejected the availability even of that ground for review of the merits.  See Wachovia Sec., LLC v. 
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commentators have argued that arbitrating claim 
construction “significantly reduces the risk that the parties 
will have to retry infringement and validity issues because 
of erroneous claim construction.”
163
  A recent empirical 
study has found that the reversal rate in claim construction 
cases has declined significantly even without any change in 
standard,
164
 making arbitration less attractive than it was 
previously.  Although the Federal Circuit recently 
reaffirmed its de novo standard of review en banc,
165
 the 
Supreme Court subsequently granted review on the issue,
166
 
making it uncertain whether this benefit of arbitration will 
persist. 
V. Conclusion 
Contract negotiation and drafting and party preferences for dispute 
resolution differ in the context of innovation compared to other commercial 
environments.  To foster and protect innovation, industry norms, pragmatic 
compromise, and informal, non-legal dispute resolution often give way to 
formal legal representation, reliance on contract documents, and, where 
necessary, court enforcement of the parties’ bargain.  Through a study of 
several different types of business contracts, including technology 
contracts, joint-venture agreements, franchise agreements, and CEO 
employment agreements, we show that a clear majority of U.S. contracting 
parties opt for courts rather than arbitration to protect at least some of their 
innovation and that, although this preference appears to be greatest for 
patent protection, it seems to persist for a wide variety of intellectual 
property.  Although we cannot fully recreate the motivation of the parties, 
 
Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 481 & nn.6 7 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing the differing interpretations taken 
by circuit courts). 
163. Stephen P. Gilbert, Arbitrating to Avoid the Markman Do Over, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.
Oct. 2006, at 1, 3. 
164. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, 
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2014).  Analyzing 
the Federal Circuit’s claim construction reversal rate, Anderson & Menell found: 
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the preference for courts seems motivated largely, though probably not 
exclusively, by the perception that courts are more effective venues for 
obtaining property-type protections, including injunctive relief. 
Our contracts also provide some evidence that party preference for 
courts is contingent on both the quality of the court system and the ability 
of the parties to obtain court enforcement of their contractual protections.  
No doubt the legal rules that apply to the protection of innovation must take 
into account the needs of society as well as the parties to the contract.  
Nevertheless, we argue that states must give very careful thought to the 
rules that they craft for the protection of innovation, at least where they 
interface with contract principles.  For better or worse, parties are good at 
contracting around undesirable legal rules, but those efforts come at the cost 
of forcing them into inferior forums for the protection of their rights. 
